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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Dennis Earl Hiebert appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional guilty plea to felony possession of a controlled substance, claiming 
the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Law enforcement received information that two individuals with 
outstanding felony arrest warrants were located on Hiebert's property where 
Hiebert operated a "scrap yard" known as "Mr. D's Auto Wrecking." (Tr. 1, p.6, 
L.25 p.7, L.8, pA5, Ls.6-16.) While on the premises looking for the two 
suspects, Detective Mark Strangio "came across a vehicle that did not fit right 
with the actual property" because it was "inconsistent" with the other vehicles, 
which were "dilapidated and very run-down." (Tr., p.7, Ls.9-15, p.10, Ls.16-18.) 
This particular vehicle was "clean, had no license plates whatsoever ... , and 
upon closer inspection, [Detective Strangio] could see from the outside of the 
vehicle that the steering column was broken apart and there was a screwdriver 
on the driver's side floorboard." (Tr., p.10, Ls.18-23.) This "raised [Detective 
Strangio's] level of suspicion" that the car was stolen, so he "ran the vehicle's 
V.I.N. number" and "confirmed that it was stolen out of Stevens County, 
1 There are three transcripts included in the record on appeal. The transcript that 
includes the application for a search warrant will be referred to as "Tr.," the 
transcript of the suppression hearing will be referred to as "Supp. Tr.," and the 
transcript that includes Hiebert's plea and sentencing will be referred to as "Sent. 
Tr." 
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Washington." (Tr., p.11, Ls.1-14.) Detective Jason Hanes, who was assisting 
Detective Strangio, ran the license plates of other cars on the property and was 
advised by dispatch that the plates were registered to different vehicles. (Tr., 
p.14, L.19 - p.15, L.1.) Based on this information, Detective Strangio requested 
a search warrant for the property to investigate for evidence of automobile theft. 
(Tr., p.13, Ls.11-17.) The magistrate issued the warrant for "Mr. D's Car Shop, 
3700 Highway 41, Oldtown, Idaho, Bonner County." (R., Vol. I, pp.32-38.) 
The following day, law enforcement sought to amend the search warrant. 
(See Tr., p.52, Ls.17-20.) Initially, the prosecutor noted there was a 
typographical error in the address in that Mr. D's is "actually located at 37000 
Highway 41," rather than 3700 Highway 41. (Tr., p.52, Ls.21-23.) Next, 
Detective Sergeant Marty Ryan testified about the activities that had taken place 
to that point in relation to the execution of the search warrant issued the day 
before. (See generally Tr., pp.53-93.) Detective Ryan explained that, on the 
property, there are several trailers that "seem to be temporary flop houses at 
different times." (Tr., p.55, Ls.16-23; see also p.56, Ls.7-21.) Detective Ryan 
also testified that they had discovered additional stolen vehicles, including a 
Winnebago motor home, and parts from stolen vehicles. (Tr., p.57, L.10 - p.62, 
L.7.) Detective Ryan further noted that, in addition to the stolen vehicles, law 
enforcement located evidence that someone was "cooking methamphetamine" at 
that location. (Tr., p.74, L.11 - p.75, L.17.) Specifically, law enforcement noted 
two propane tanks "on the back side of the property" that had a "bluish, green 
haze" on the brass fittings, which is "very distinct" and is consistent with storing 
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"anhydrous ammonia" used for making methamphetamine. (Id.) In addition, 
there was a camp trailer that was "all locked up" and looked abandoned, but it 
had electricity running to it from Hiebert's home. (Tr., p.75, L.22 - p.76, L.22.) 
And, when law enforcement walked by the area of the camper, they noticed an 
"odor of a methamphetamine laboratory." (Tr., p.76, L.24 - p.77, L.15.) A 
"protective sweep" of the camper revealed a bindle of methamphetamine and 
paraphernalia. (R., p.263; Tr., p.S1, L.25 - p.S2, L.5.) 
Based on the additional evidence presented, the magistrate issued an 
amended search warrant expanding the authorized scope of the search and the 
time within which to complete the search. (R., Vol. I, pp.54-62.) A second 
search warrant was issued six days later to allow the officers to seize two 
additional items from Hiebert's property - another stolen vehicle and a license 
plate from a stolen vehicle. (R., pp.104-10S.) 
The state ultimately charged Hiebert with seven counts of grand theft by 
possession of stolen property and one count of possession of a controlled 
substance, methamphetamine. (R., Vol. I, pp.39-40, 130-133, 152-155; R., Vol. 
II, pp.290-295.) Hiebert filed a motion to suppress, contending the initial entry 
onto his property constituted an illegal search and "[t]he information obtained in 
the illegal search led to the issuance of a search warrant." (R., Vol. I, p.167.) 
Hiebert specifically requested suppression of "all evidence obtained ... including 
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but not limited to the search of [his] property and house."2 (R., Vol. I, p.168.) 
The district court held a hearing on Hiebert's motion after which it entered a 
written decision denying his request for suppression. (R., Vol. II, pp.260-268.) 
Hiebert thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to the possession of a 
controlled substance charge reserving the right to challenge the court's denial of 
his suppression motion; the state dismissed the remaining charges. 3 (R., Vol. II, 
pp.296-300; Sent. Tr., p.9, Ls.6-11, p.13, Ls.1-6, p.14, Ls.8-14.) The court 
imposed a unified five-year sentence with two years fixed for possession of 
methamphetamine but suspended the sentence and placed Hiebert on probation. 
(R., Vol. II, pp.310-315.) Hiebert filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., Vol. II, 
pp.327-329,331-333.) 
2Hiebert also sought suppression of "all evidence and statements obtained during 
the custodial interrogation," claiming "the officer failed to adequately advise [him] 
of his rights and/or obtain a waiver." (R., Vol. I, p.168.) However, at the outset of 
the suppression hearing, the state stipulated to suppression of Hiebert's 
statements. (Supp. Tr., p.5, Ls.13-17.) 
3 Hiebert initially pled guilty to three counts of grand theft by possession and the 
possession of a controlled substance charge, but later withdrew his guilty pleas 




Hiebert states the issues on appeal as: 
a. Whether the District Court erred in denying the Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress? 
b. Whether all of the evidence in the case was the result of a 
warrantless entry and search? 
c. Whether the District Court erred in its analysis, decision, acts 
and in the entry of the Memorandum Decision RE: Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress entered November 28, 2012? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.7 (punctuation original).) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 




Hiebert Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Denying His 
Suppression Motion 
A. Introduction 
Hiebert contends, as he did below, that Detective Strangio's actions in 
ascertaining the V.I.N. number from the stolen vehicle constituted an unlawful 
search because, Hiebert argues, Detective Strangio "depart[ed] [from] the normal 
access route or vantage point" in order to "obtain the VIN number." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.9.) Hiebert further asserts that, because the initial search warrant was 
issued based on the results of Detective Strangio's unconstitutional actions, the 
warrant was invalid.4 (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.) Application of the correct legal 
standards to the facts shows Hiebert has failed to show the district court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress. 
4 Hiebert also complains that the initial search warrant had "the wrong address" 
and asserts the "incorrect address is sufficient to suppress the evidence gained 
by the Warrant(s) [sic]." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) This Court should decline to 
consider this argument because Hiebert fails to support it with any authority. 
Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 234 P.3d 699 (2010) 
(citations omitted) ("Where an appellant fails to assert his assignments of error 
with particularity and to support his position with sufficient authority, those 
assignments of error are too indefinite to be heard by the Court. A general attack 
on the findings and conclusions of the district court, without specific reference to 
evidentiary or legal errors, is insufficient to preserve an issue."); State v. Zichko, 
129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) ("When issues on appeal are not 
supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be 
considered."). Even if the Court were to consider the issue, Hiebert's claim 
would fail because the error in the address in the initial warrant, which was 
corrected the following day, would not render the initial warrant invalid given the 
description of the property and pictures that were provided that more than 
adequately described the place to be searched so that there was no risk that 
officers would mistakenly search a place other than the one intended. Compare 
State v. O'Keefe, 143 Idaho 278, 285, 141 P.3d 1147, 1154 (Ct. App. 2006). 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated: when a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by sUbstantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300,302, 160 P.3d 739,741 (2007). 
C. Hiebert Has Failed To Demonstrate Error In The Denial Of His 
Suppression Motion 
In reviewing whether a magistrate court properly issued a search warrant, 
"the appellate court's function is limited to insuring that the magistrate had a 
'substantial basis' for concluding that probable cause existed, with great 
deference paid to the magistrate's determination." State v. Fisher, 140 Idaho 
365, 369, 93 P.3d 696, 700 (2004) (citations omitted). A defendant challenging a 
search pursuant to a search warrant bears the burden of proving any 
constitutional violation. State v. O'Keefe, 143 Idaho 278, 287, 141 P.3d 1147, 
1156 (Ct. App. 2006). 
Hiebert contends the initial search warrant was invalid because its 
issuance was based on Detective Strangio's act of "depart[ing] [from] the normal 
access route or vantage point" in order to further investigate whether the car he 
saw from the "normal access route" was stolen. (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) 
Because Detective Strangio's departure from the "normal access route" did not 
violate Hiebert's constitutional rights, Hiebert has failed to meet his burden of 
showing the warrant issued based on Detective Strangio's actions was invalid. 
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"Under the open view doctrine, a police officer's observations made from a 
location open to the public do not constitute a search. This is because one 
cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in what is knowingly exposed to 
public view." State v. Christensen, 131 Idaho 143, 146, 953 P.2d 583, 586 
(1998) (citations omitted). Thus, "when the police come onto private property to 
conduct an investigation or for some other legitimate purpose and restrict their 
movements to places where ordinary visitors could be expected to go, 
observations from such vantage points are lawful." State v. Tietsort, 145 Idaho 
112,115,175 P.3d 801, 804 (Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted). "Direct access 
routes to the house, including driveways, parking areas, and pathways to the 
entry, are areas to which the public is impliedly invited." & "Police officers 
restricting their activity to such areas are permitted the same intrusion and the 
same level of observation as would be expected from a reasonably respectful 
citizen." & A court may find an intrusion "exceed[s] the scope of the implied 
invitation" only if there is a "substantial and unreasonable departure from the 
normal access route." Id. "What is lawfully seen in open view may furnish 
probable cause for a warrant." & 
At the suppression hearing, Detective Strangio testified that he and 
Detective Hanes went to Hiebert's property, known as Mr. D's Auto Wrecking, 
based upon information that two fugitives with outstanding warrants were located 
on the property. (Supp. Tr., p.8, Ls.14-18, p.9, Ls.1-4.) When the detectives 
arrived, the gate was open and there was a sign on the gate that read "OPEN." 
(Supp. Tr., p.10, Ls.10-14; Exhibit B.) Detectives Strangio and Hanes got out of 
8 
their vehicles and knocked on what they "thought was the main residence at the 
location" and "announced sheriff's office several times" but "got no verbal reply" 
and did not "see anybody around the premises." (Supp. Tr., p.9, Ls.5-9; see also 
p.17, Ls.13-19.) The detectives, therefore, proceeded on foot onto the property 
as it was "very common to find people on the back portion of the property." 
(Supp. Tr., p.17, Ls.20-24.) In fact, Detective Strangio explained, "[iJt is a 
common area to find fugitives, other stolen vehicles, drug involvement." (Supp. 
Tr., p.18, Ls.10-11.) H[S]ince 2000," law enforcement in that area have "had at 
least 80 . . . law enforcement issues involving drugs, stolen vehicles, 
methamphetamine, stolen property, fugitives, and crimes of violence occurring on 
that property." (Supp. Tr., p.18, Ls.11-15.) And, when Detective Strangio had 
been there in the past, there were people "resid[ing] in the small camp trailers" 
located there. (Supp. Tr., p.18, Ls.22-24.) 
During the walk toward the back of the property, Detective Strangio 
noticed a car that was "out of place" because it was clean and did not have 
license plates. (Supp. Tr., p.19, Ls.2-10.) The car was between two trailers. 
(Exhibit G.) When Detective Strangio walked over to the car he noticed evidence 
indicating it had been stolen and confirmed as much after running the V.I.N. 
number that was on the dash, which he could read from outside the car. (Supp. 
Tr., p.20, Ls.10-22.) Detective Strangio also knocked on the door of the trailer 
next to the car to see if anyone was inside but did not get an answer. (Supp. Tr., 
p.19, L.18 - p.20, L.3.) 
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Since Hiebert operates a business that is open to the public and that was 
open on the date Detectives Strangio and Hanes were on the property, they, like 
other members of the public were impliedly, if not explicitly, invited onto Hiebert's 
property. Hiebert does not seem to contest that point given his focus on 
Detective Strangio's act of "depart[ing]" from "the normal access route" in order to 
obtain the vehicle identification number of one of the cars. (Appellant's Brief, 
p.g.) While Detective Strangio unquestionably left the dirt path in order to get the 
number (Supp. Tr., p.22, L.25 - p.23, L.3), such a departure was not sUbstantial 
or unreasonable under the circumstances. Ordinary visitors to a wreckage yard 
like the one operated by Hiebert would surely feel free to look at the items 
available on the yard and it would not be unusual for such a potential customer to 
be interested in parts that may be available from a newer model, cleaner car -
the very traits that attracted Detective Strangio's attention. That Detective 
Strangio was interested in the car for a different reason does not make his 
actions unreasonable. Indeed, under the open view doctrine, the only relevant 
question is whether Detective Strangio's act of leaving the access route was 
beyond the scope of the implied invitation; Detective Strangio's motives are 
completely irrelevant to that question. Because Detective Strangio did not 
behave in a manner that exceeded the scope of the implied invitation to a 
prospective customer of Hiebert's business, the district court correctly concluded 
Hiebert was not entitled to suppression. 
Even if the Court concludes that it was constitutionally impermissible for 
Detective Strangio to leave the path in order to get the vehicle identification 
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number off of the suspicious vehicle, there was still sufficient probable cause to 
support issuance of the warrant. "In determining the validity of a search warrant 
whose underlying application contains illegally obtained information, the ultimate 
question is whether the remaining information presented to the magistrate, after 
the tainted evidence is excluded, contains adequate facts from which the 
magistrate could have included that probable cause existed for the issuance of a 
search warrant." State v. Revenaugh, 133 Idaho 774, 779, 992 P.2d 769, 774 
(1999) (internal quotations omitted); see also State v. Tietsort, 145 Idaho 112, 
116, 175 P.3d 801, 805 (Ct. App. 2007). Probable cause is based on "a 
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth 
in the affidavit before [the magistrate], including the 'veracity' and 'basis of 
knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability 
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
Detective Strangio's observations from the access route provided 
suspicion that the car he noticed was stolen because it "did not fit right" with the 
other cars on the property given that it was clean and had no license plates. 
(Tr. 5, p.7, Ls.9-12, p.22, Ls.18-24.) In addition to Detective Strangio's 
observations, Detective Hanes ran "several of the license plates through 
dispatch" and those plates "came back to different vehicles than what the plates 
were registered to." (Tr., p.14, L.13 - p.15, L.8.) Detective Stranglo testified that 
5 The transcript that contains testimony relating to the search warrants (referred 
to herein as "Tr.") was, by stipulation, submitted for the court's consideration in 
relation to Hiebert's motion to suppress. (Supp. Tr., p.29, LsA-18.) 
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is "consistent with somebody whose [sic} trying to hide the identity of the 
vehicles." (Tr., p.19, Ls.12-17.) When asked if Detective Hanes left the roadway 
to get the license plate numbers, Detective Strangio answered: "Well, I don't 
know if he left the roadway but from where I saw him standing, he was in the 
driveway.,,6 (Tr., p.24, Ls.1-6.) 
The information provided to the magistrate beyond the fact that there was 
a stolen vehicle on Hiebert's property was sufficient to establish probable cause 
to believe the property contained evidence of the same crime for which the 
warrant issued. Accordingly, even if the vehicle identification number is excluded 
from the equation, issuance of a warrant would still have been proper. 
Hiebert has failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon Hiebert's conditional guilty pleas to felony possession of a controlled 
substance. 
DATED this 10th day of April, 2014. 
J,¥,S CA M. LORELLO 
Deputy Attorney General 
V 
6 Importantly, Hiebert has not claimed otherwise. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 10th day of April, 2014, served two 
true and correct copies of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by placing the 
copies in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
REX A. FINNEY 
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120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
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JMUpm 
IJE~SICA M. LORELLO 
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